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WEB APPENDIX
Suboptimality of trivial interventions under buybacks
Suppose that pg <B−S and so the seller will not be able to ﬁnance the new project if she joins
the governmental scheme. Let us ﬁrst look for a pure strategy equilibrium. Either pm <B− S
and then there is no private market as there are no gains from trade. Or pm >B− S and then
no-one joins the governmental scheme.
Let θ denote the lowest value of θg such that the market can be revived when types θ ≤ θg







































unless pg =0 . Offering such a pg necessarily reduces welfare.
Assume next that θ∗∗(pg) ≥ θ. Then if θg = θ∗∗(pg), pm + S ≥ B and so pm >p g,a
contradiction since no-one would join the government’s scheme.

















whose derivative with respect to p is negative. Hence, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for market rebound is
that at p = θgR0 − S, p ≥ B − S or θgR0 ≥ B.So necessarily θg = θ and ﬁnancing by the market must be random. When refusing to
join the government’s scheme, the seller is ﬁnanced by the market at price pm = B − S with
probability α and the market breaks down with probability 1 − α such that




































W is linear in α (pg is a function of α, whereas all the other variables are being held constant
as α varies). If W decreases with α, then it is bounded above by














If W increases with α, the maximum is achieved at α =1 . The intervention then coincides
with the minimumnon-trivialintervention,except thatthere isno investmentfor typesbelowθg;
hence this interventionis dominated by doing the minimalnon-trivial interventionand investing
for all participating sellers.
Ex-ante moral hazard under buybacks
Let us extend the model by introducing a “stage 0”, at which the seller chooses the asset qual-
ity. At private and unobserved cost Ψ(e), the seller generates distribution F(θ|e) such that
∂(f/F)/∂e > 0 and ∂(f/F)/∂θ < 0.
2Proposition 11.
(i) Strategic substitutability. Consider an arbitrary (i.e., possibly out of equilibrium) ex-
pectation e∗. Under ex-ante moral hazard, the seller chooses a higher effort (e) when
expected to choose a lower one (e∗).
(ii) Consequently, there exists a unique equilibrium.
(iii) If there is an equilibrium intervention, effort is lower than in the absence of intervention.
Intuitively, if the equilibrium effort is high, interventions face less adverse selection and are
more generous (higher p). This implies that the seller expects to be bailed out more often and
so puts in less effort.








Condition (A.1 ) deﬁnes a policy cutoff θ∗(e∗) as a function of the equilibrium value of effort.
From ∂(f|F)/∂e > 0, θ∗ is an increasing function of e∗.

















or, after an integration by parts























dθ. The equilibrium may involve mixed strategies by the
government if at the level  e at which the government is indifferent between an intervention and
3laissez-faire, R( e) <  e. The equilibrium then has e =  e and randomization by the government
between intervention and laissez-faire.






Commitment. Let us now assume that the government can commit to a price pg (and therefore







The cross-partial derivative of this function with respect to θ∗ and e is R0Fe(θ∗|e) < 0.S oa
lower θ∗ induces a higher effort. In turn, the government wants to commit to a price that is
lower than that that will prevail under non-commitment.
Proof of Proposition 6



















From the proof of Lemma 2, there exists
v
y ≥ y, with strict inequality if and only if z( θ) ≡















y = ym , then (a) z =0(and so
v
y = y) and (b) x(θ) cannot be equal to 0 on a positive-measure
subset of [0,
v
θ], otherwise the buyers would make a strictly negative proﬁt. The outcome then
coincides with the constrained efﬁcient outcome.
4So let us assume that
v
y<y m and so, a fortiori, y<y m . Because x(θ)=0for θ ∈ [ θ,θ∗],
the proﬁt made by buyers on those types is strictly negative. Furthermore, it must be the case
that θR0 + S − U(θ) > 0 on an interval [ θ − ε,  θ] for some ε>0.‡
Suppose ﬁrst that z>0 and consider an “entering buyer” (by this we mean a buyer with a
zero or arbitrarily small equilibrium proﬁt, as we will show that the proposed contract makes a
strictly positive proﬁt) offering a single skin-in-the-game contract specifying {z−κ,y+η,x =
1}§ deﬁning a schedule  U(θ)=max {B,z − κ +( y + η)θ + b, U0(θ)}, such that η>0 and
U( θ − ε)=z − κ + b +( y + η)( θ − ε).
The buyer then attracts at least types in [ θ − ε,  θ], which by continuity yields a strictly positive
proﬁt for (ε,η,κ) small. He may also attract types in [ θ,θ∗], which a fortiori are proﬁtable. He
does not attract any type below  θ − ε. Hence the deviation is strictly proﬁtable.
Suppose ﬁnally that z =0 . Let the deviating buyer make a single skin-in-the-game offer
{0,y+ η,x =1 }. From robust choice this schedule attracts exactly types in [θ∗∗,θ ∗] with
θ∗∗ <  θ, as well as some (proﬁtable) types above θ∗. But even if θ∗∗ =0 , this deviation is
strictly proﬁtable since y + η<y m for η small.
Proof of Proposition 7




















Under good news about the prior distribution, f(θ)/f(θ∗) decreases and so ∂W/∂θ∗ is positive
over a wider range of θ∗s.
(v) Recall the ﬁrst-order condition under pure buybacks:
f(θ
∗)(1 + λ)S = F(θ
∗)λ(R0 + λS).




θR0 + S − U(θ)

≥ R0 − y>0.
Furthermore, π(θ) ≤ θR0 + S − U(θ);s oi fθR0 + S − U( θ) ≤ 0, the buyers’ proﬁt is strictly negative.
§ It is also possible to upset the equilibrium through a contract specifying the same z.



















The LHS of this inequality exceeds 1 since θ∗R0 = b + θ∗y. The RHS is always smaller
than 1.
Proof of Proposition 10





denote the size of government involvement. Welfare can now be rewritten as
 W ≡ W − εmg = E[Sx(θ)] + λE[π(θ)] − εmg + θR0 (A.2)
where π(θ) is the monetary outcomeon type θ (π(θ)+U(θ)=θR0+Sx(θ)). The maximization






is a priori complex.
But consider any possible intervention and corresponding Θg and Θm. Let {x(·),U(·)} be
the combined (government plus market) mechanism faced by the seller. Consider having the
government deviate to offer the same mechanism {x(·),U(·)} and asking precisely the types
in Θg to participate in the government’s scheme. This is incentive-compatible and produces
exactly the same welfare and intervention costs as before. So without loss of generality we can
6restrict attention to strategy proﬁles where the government offers the same mechanism as the
market (but attracts only a subset of types). So, letting  π(θ) ≡ θR0 +S −V (θy) where y is the












[1 − ξg(θ)] π(θ)dF(θ) ≥ 0 (μ)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is −ε − μ π(θ). Because  π(θ) is strictly in-
creasing (from Lemma 4), there is indeed a cutoff θg such that ξg(θ)=1if and only if θ<θ g.
Finally, the theorem of the maximum guarantees that as ε converges to 0, the optimum con-
verges to the mechanism of subsection B.
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